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policy outcome variables are introduced. As a first result, the end of the cold war has
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donors reward good economic policy outcomes since 1990. Second, aid is found
generally progressive, for most donors. It appears also that most donors pay a great
attention to political governance when making their aid decision.
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1 Introduction
Foreign aid has attracted a lot of interest in the literature on development finance. Most
of the papers focus on the impact of aid on economic growth and social indicators, and
on the debate whether aid really improves development conditions in the recipient
countries. Corruption, inefficiencies, bureaucratic failures are the main factors
explaining why aid does not always promote development. However, as pointed out by
Alesina and Dollar (2000), the first aspects to look at are the criteria governing aid
allocation policies. If aid responds only to strategic and political considerations, there is
indeed no reason for aid to be effective in promoting growth or reducing poverty.
Several papers have addressed the issue of allocation of bilateral aid to recipient
countries. The interest in this topic began in the mid-1950s with Behrman (1955/6).
Broadly speaking, up to the work of McKinley and Little (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979)
the analysis was rather anecdotal and based on simple empirical observation1 (Gounder
1994). McKinley and Little have introduced econometrics in the debate on the factors
influencing aid allocation and have structured the discussion around two alternative
determinants: the ‘recipient need’ and the ‘donor interest’. However, as shown by
McGillivray (2002a), whenever all of these variables are relevant for the explanation of
aid allocation, one needs to introduce them all together in the same model to avoid
biases due to omitted variables. This gave rise to a generation of so-called ‘hybrids’
models. Econometric methods have also improved over time, but the literature has
mainly concentrated so far on one donor for a given period of time (recently using panel
data)2, or several donors in cross section.3
Moreover, many papers do not take account of the truncated nature of the aid variable.
Yet, running OLS on the amount of aid allocated generates biases (see McGillivray
2002a for an illustration). Indeed, as first documented by Dudley and Montmarquette
(1976), the process of aid allocation entails two kinds of questions: whether to allocate
aid to a given potential recipient and, in case of a positive answer, how much aid to give
to this recipient. To evaluate such a process empirically, three estimation methods are
available, which have similar, but not identical, econometric properties: either using a
two-part model, a Heckman  two-step procedure or running a Tobit regression.
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991, 1992) use a two-part model to estimate the
Australian and British allocation of aid. Gang and Lehman (1990) run a Tobit model to
study the allocation of American aid to Latin American countries. Tarp et al. (1998)
apply the Heckman method to estimate a panel model of bilateral Danish aid allocation.
Trumbull and Wall (1994) utilize the same procedure extended to multiple donors. They
examine total official development aid (bilateral and multilateral, whoever the donor)
for 86 recipient countries covering the 1984-89 period. They introduce both period and
recipient fixed effects. To our knowledge, this is the only paper on several donors’ aid
allocation using panel data and correcting for the truncated nature of the dependent
variable. The analysis is nevertheless limited to a short period of time and to a two-
dimensional (recipient-year) panel, as the dependent variable is the total amount of aid
received from the whole bilateral donor community. This aggregation is valid only
                                                
1 Except for Dudley and Montmarquette (1976).
2 Cf. in particular Tarp et al. (1998), Arvin and Drewes (2001) and Gounder (1994).
3 Cf. Alesina and Dollar (2000).2
under the assumption that all donors are homogeneous which—according to the
available studies of individual donors’ aid allocation policies (see Tarp et al. 1998, for a
survey)—seems to be wrong.
The present paper adds to the literature as it runs an equation on bilateral aid allocation
on a very rich dataset, covering 20 years (1980-99), 22 donors and 137 recipients. This
permits a three-dimensional panel study (recipient-year-donor) and allows for
comparisons between different donors. Up to now, such a complete study has never
been undertaken. Because of the length of the observation period, it also makes it
possible to compare aid allocation policies in the 1980s and in the 1990s. This addresses
the very interesting question of the change in the process of aid allocation after the end
of the cold war.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some descriptive statistics on
aid allocation and different influencing variables. Section 3 runs econometric estimates
on the total three-dimensional panel and gives conclusions on the average donor
behaviour. Section 4 assesses the question of the change in allocation behaviour
between the 1980s and the 1990s. Section 5 runs separate regressions for the individual
donors and test differences in their aid allocation policies. Section 6 provides a
discussion of the robustness of our results, based on consideration of an alternative
method of estimation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Descriptive analysis
Before going to the econometric analysis, we provide in this section a brief overview of
our data, which suggests that both beneficiary needs and policy performance variables,
on one hand, and self-interest variables, on the other hand, influence the aid allocation
policies that are implemented by donors. A list of data sources is provided in
Appendix 1.
Our sample is the largest and the most exhaustive available for the 1980 and 1990
decades. It covers 137 recipient countries and the 22 donors of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. For each of the years from 1980 to 1999,
we observe aid commitments received by each recipient from each DAC member. This
means that we deal here with a three-dimensional (year x donor x recipient) panel
database, of potentially close to 60,000 observations. The number of observations will,
of course, depend on the availability of explanatory variables. Depending on the list of
explanatory variables, we still have between approximately 14,000 and 42,000
observations.
We choose aid commitments rather than disbursements, because, as documented by
McGillivray and White (1993), this variable better reflects the donor decisions. Indeed,
donors have total control of the commitments, compared to disbursements which
depend in part on the recipients’ willingness and administrative capacity to get the
money. Moreover, in what follows we usually consider aid per capita (i.e., aid
commitment divided by the recipient population) as the dependent variable. In order to
neutralize the effect of inflation, these flows are converted into US dollars per capita at
1985 prices, using the OECD GDP deflator index as a proxy for world inflation. There
is an active debate on the choice between aid per capita and aid in level as the3
endogenous variable (see McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992 and Neumayer 2003). Here,
we opt for the per capita commitments as they allow us to test whether the small
countries receive more international support per capita than the big ones. This would not
be possible when considering aid volumes, as big countries receive more aid in absolute
terms. Moreover, using aid levels as a dependent variable could lead to serious
heteroscedasticity issues, since residuals would be probably, in absolute value, much
bigger for large recipients than for small recipients. Given the econometric method used
here, there is no simple way to correct such heteroscedasticity problems.
2.1 Beneficiary needs and policy performance variables
The most straightforward indicator of beneficiary needs is income per capita, measured
at international prices. If aid is to be allocated on the basis of recipient needs, the
poorest countries should receive more, and the richest countries less. Consequently, the
expectation would be that aid policies mitigate the concentration of income distribution
between recipient countries.
This can be graphically tested by considering the cumulative distribution curve of aid
commitments when countries are ranked by income per capita, i.e., we rank countries by
income per capita and then we compare the cumulative distribution of aid received by
recipients against the cumulative distribution of their populations.4 This curve is drawn
in the following figures (Figures 1a to 1c), together with the Lorenz curve representing
the cumulative distribution of incomes. Such graphs are drawn for 1980, 1990 and 1999.
If aid allocation policies were redistributive, the curve representing the distribution of
aid would be above the diagonal. On the whole sample, as suggested by Figures 1a to
1c, it is not. This suggests that, overall, aid policies are not necessarily geared toward
assistance to the poorest countries. However, as is shown below, this conclusion is not
robust.
As a matter of fact, two recipient countries play a major role in this result: India and
China. Both are relatively poor, receive relatively few commitments for aid, and have
very large populations. As a consequence, Figures 1a to 1c simply indicate that a citizen
of India with, on average, one of the lowest GDP per capita, receives less assistance
than most developing-country citizens. The same is true for China in 1980. However,
since China grew very fast in the 1980s and 1990s, it is no longer true that the Chinese
are, on average, among the poorest people in the world. This explains why in 1999
(Figure 1c), and to some extent in 1990 (Figure 1b), the redistributive impact of aid
allocation is higher than in 1980 (Figure 1a).
An easy way to check this is to draw the same curves but exclude India and China. This
is done in Figures 2a to 2c, indicating clearly that aid is progressive. It is, however, less
progressive in the 1990s than in the 1980s. This is tested later in our econometric
sections, based on the total sample including, of course, China and India, but without
giving each recipient its population weight.
                                                
4 For a similar, but numerical instead of graphical, approach, see the discussion of the Suit’s index in
the survey by White and McGillivray (1995).4
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Note: The Freedom House indices increase from 1 for democratic countries to 7 for dictatorships).
Since we use a combination of two indicators (political rights and civil liberty), we have potentially
13 possible marks, but for simplification, we consider only the integer part of the average in this
graph (for example, 3.5 is included in the category 3). We shall apply the same simplification in
our econometric sections.
A consequence of these findings is also that aid may be dependent on the size of the
recipient country, an observation found quite often in earlier literature. Countries like
China and India receive little assistance partly because of their size. This might also be
the case for Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance. Conversely, some of the
smallest and least poor developing countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia
receive high levels of assistance per capita.
However, some of the biggest countries are also characterized by poor policies, as has
been the case for Nigeria during most of the period. Conversely, good governance and
good policymaking could be more common in small countries, which face less
fractionalization. As a matter of fact, in our sample, 77 per cent of the small-sized
countries (with a population of less than 2 million) have good levels of political rights
and civil liberty (Freedom House) but these constitute only 37 per cent of the sample
observations. Moreover, Figure 3 (where observations are not weighted by their
population size) suggests that when political rights and civil liberty improve, recipients
receive higher aid commitments.
The quality of economic and social policy is more difficult to measure. In this paper, we
have chosen to use performance indicators. For the sake of double checking, in our
econometric exercise we test a large set of several complementary economic and social
indicators, but only a few of them will show up as significant explanatory variables of
aid. Therefore, although we have tested more indicators (notably inflation, budget
deficit, and the foreign exchange black market premium), we concentrate here on the
four which lead at least partially to significant results:
i)  aggregate growth rate (lagged one year in order to avoid simultaneity issues);
ii)  flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) received;
iii)  gross primary school enrolment; and
iv)  infant mortality rate.7
However, when considered individually, these indicators suggest that aid flows do not
necessarily reward good policies. This is illustrated in Table 1, where we have tested
Spearman rank correlations between aid commitments received by developing countries
and their economic and social performance indicators. Only foreign direct investment
seems to be positively and significantly correlated with aid commitments. This contrasts
with the very significant correlation found with the civil liberty and  political freedom
index. These results are only indicative, since they do not take account of the overall
context in which the performances are observed. In particular, poor countries, which
tend to receive more aid because of their poverty, usually also have low social
development indicators, such as primary enrolment rates and high infant mortality rates.
In other words, social policy performance indicators may also be viewed by donors as a
measure of need. We come back to this issue in the discussion of our econometric
results, since only the empirical evidence can provide an answer to this question.
Table 1
Spearman rank correlation between aid per capita
and policy performance indicators of recipients
 1980s   1990s  
Civil lib.+pol. freedom -0.340*** -0.350***
growth[-1] 0.127 0.062 
FDI 0.265*** 0.187***
Primary enrlt -0.155* -0.114* 
inf. Mortality 0.134 0.077 
Note: *** = significant at 1% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level.
2.2 Self-interest of donors
Given that performance seems to explain only partially aid allocation, it is tempting to
look for more explanations of aid allocation policies in self-interest variables.
The first indicator that we introduce is the flow of bilateral trade with the recipient
country, expressed as a percentage of donor GDP. This bilateral ratio describes the
strength of commercial links between a donor and a recipient. A foreign assistance
policy based on the self-interests of the donor will typically be biased toward countries
that tend naturally to have more trade with the donor. There might be a simultaneity bias
when aid is tied, since more tied aid will imply more imports from the donor. However,
the risk is limited since we are working on aid commitment flows, and aid
disbursements usually lag behind commitments, particularly for project loans or grants,
which require building new equipment. Table 2 provides a test of Spearman rank
correlation between bilateral aid commitments per capita and bilateral trade ratios. A
positive correlation is found for the 1980s for all donors, although a large variance
exists among donors. However, this correlation becomes non-existent in several
countries in the 1990s. These results must, however, be considered with caution since
trade flows are also correlated with country performance. Richer recipients tend to trade
more, and they may receive less assistance. The same is true for larger recipients.
Moreover, newcomers in the aid business (Greece, Portugal and Spain) tend to duplicate
the self-interest behaviour observed in the 1980s. As a consequence, a positive
correlation is still observed for a majority of the donors in the 1990s.8
Finally, another indicator of the donors’ self-interest may be found in the privileged
relations with their former colonies, usually their political and commercial allies. Such
specific links between the former colonies and the former ruling powers are only
partially correlated with trade flows, since they may extend beyond trade links.
Moreover, the former colonies are not necessarily significant traders, as the majority of
them are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 3 suggests that alliances based on historical-political ties play a major role in the
aid allocation policies of France, United Kingdom and, in the 1990s, Spain and
Portugal. A similar bias is observed in the aid policy of the United States with respect to
its assistance to Egypt (and, of course, also to Israel, but since the latter is not a
developing country, we have not included it in our database).
Table 2
Spearman correlation between bilateral trade ratios
and bilateral aid commitment per capita









Canada 0.157* 0.126 
United Kingdom 0.292*** 0.096 
Denmark 0.126 0.090 
Germany 0.080 0.052 
Japan 0.206** 0.045 
Switzerland 0.120 0.027 
Ireland 0.157* 0.009 
Norway 0.164* 0.008 
Netherlands 0.082 -0.016




Note: No results are shown for Luxembourg, for which trade data are incomplete throughout the 1990s.
Table 3
Aid commitment per capita and political alliances (1985 US$)
Former colonies Other countries
Donor 1980s 1990s 1980 1990s
France 6.96 5.65 0.28 0.19
United Kingdom 0.60 0.34 0.09 0.11
(excl. India) 1.09 0.66 0.09 0.11
Spain – 0.40 – 0.03
Portugal – 0.29 – ε
Egypt Other countries
1980s 1990s 1980.0 1990s
United States 25.11 28.98 1.04 0.589
3 The average donor behaviour
3.1 Estimation method
The majority of bilateral aid commitment flows are equal to zero, because donors tend
to allocate aid only to specific targeted countries. Consequently, we deal with a
censored variable, which implies that we need to implement a non-linear method of
estimation suited to deal with censored data. In earlier literature, three different
approaches have been utilized, which have similar but not entirely equivalent
econometric properties, being both based on maximum likelihood methods:5
−   A two-part model: in the first step, a probit model determines the probability of
receiving assistance, and in a second, a linear model explaining aid commitments
is estimated, based only on strictly positive observations. In this procedure, the
choice of the recipient is independent from the amount of aid allocated to this
country thereafter. This method suffers from the risk of introducing a selection bias
in the second step, since the fact that a country receives strictly positive aid flows
is not independent from the right-hand variables.
−   A Heckman’s two-step method: the procedure is the same as for the two-part
model, except that in the second step, the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the
first step is introduced together with explanatory variables, in order to correct bias
due to the endogenous nature of the allocation of positive amount of aid.
−   A Tobit model, which estimates the aid commitments in only one step, takes
account of the endogenous selection of the recipients. The difference with the
Heckman’s method is that the exogenous variables are supposed to have the same
impact on the probability of receiving aid and on the amount of aid allocated
thereafter.
We have chosen the third approach. Authors such as McGillivray suggest that the
second procedure is more appropriate, since it does not constrain factors that determine
the selection of a country as aid recipient or those that influence the amount of aid it
receives to be the same. Given the large size of our database, and the complexity
introduced by the three-dimensional nature of our panel, this approach is more easily
implemented than the second one. Estimating a Heckman model in a panel model,
where provision needs to be made for the possible existence of fixed effects, is not
straightforward and is not available in standard econometric packages.6 Moreover, there
is a risk of loss of robustness of estimators in the Heckman procedure if, as it is our
case, the lists of explanatory variables are the same in both equations being estimated.
In this section, we provide estimations based on the full dataset, i.e. assuming that all
donors have the same behaviour. We have to take into account, however, the different
size of the individual aid budgets. Moreover, these aid budgets vary over time. In order
to consider these time- and donor-specific fluctuations, it is desirable to introduce fixed
effects for each pair of donor and year. However, in a Tobit model estimated with the
standard parametric maximum-likelihood method, if we introduced fixed-effects, they
would be biased. Consequently, we estimate, instead, a random-effects model, where
the random-effects depend on both the year of observation and the donor. Another
                                                
5  See Neumayer (2003)7 for an extended discussion.
6 At least, it is not available in Stata, which we have used.10
possibility would have been to introduce recipient and donor random effects similar to
Lloyd, Morrissey and Osei (2001). Nevertheless, as documented by these authors, time
plays a very important role in the allocation of aid, so that we opt for introducing time
rather than recipient effects.
The equation to be estimated is, therefore, written as follows:
) , 0 ( , , , , , , , t j t j i t j i t j i v u Bx Max y + + =
where i stands for the recipient, j for the donor and t for time, y is aid per capita, x is a
vector of explanatory variables and B the vector of associated parameters, u and v are
two independent normally-distributed random variables, the latter standing for the
donor-year specific effects.
3.2 Explanatory variables
Most of our explanatory variables were already introduced in the previous section, and
their definition and expected impact are rather straightforward. Therefore, they need
only a few explanations.
3.2.1Beneficiary needs and policy performance variables
−   RGDPcap measures the GDP per capita of the recipient country in 1985 US
dollars, at international (PPP) prices; its expected sign is negative;
−   Pop measures the population of the recipient country, measured in millions; its
expected sign is negative;
−   Growth[-1] is the previous year aggregate growth rate of the recipient; it is an
indicator of the performance of economic policies and its expected sign is positive;
−   FDI is the flow of foreign direct investment of the recipient, expressed as
percentage of its GDP; it is also an indicator of the performance of economic
policies and its expected sign is positive;
−   Primary enrlt is the gross primary enrolment rate of the recipient (in per cent) and
is an indicator of the performance of social policies; its expected sign is positive;
−   Inf. mortality is the infant mortality rate of the recipient (in ‰) and is also an
indicator of the performance of social policies; its expected sign is negative;
−   Aid_others is the total aid commitments (per capita) provided by other bilateral
donors. This variable, utilized for instance by Tarp et al. (1998), is introduced to
test whether a donor on average takes note of aid allocations decided by other
donors, which may happen if a given donor considers that other donors tend to
give more aid to countries that deserve assistance. This variable must be
considered with caution, because it may create a simultaneity bias. However, given
the small size of its parameter, its introduction does not change the magnitude of
the other parameters, which suggests that if there is a simultaneity bias, it is only of
a small scale.11
The index of civil liberty and political freedom (henceforth called globfree) needs
specific treatment. This index is a polytomic dummy variable. Its size has no
significance. Introducing this variable directly in the regression would introduce
possible bias, since there is no reason, for instance, to assume that the marginal impact
of a shift of this variable from 1 to 2 would be the same as the impact of a shift from 2
to 3, or half the impact of a shift from 1 to 3. The only proper treatment of this variable
is to decompose it into as many dichotomic dummy variables as it has occurrences, and
to introduce each and every one of these dummy variables in the regression. In
principle, since we use an average of two indices (civil liberty, and political freedom),
each with seven occurrences, we would have to deal with 13 occurrences. We propose,
however, two simplifications which collapse the number of dummy variables taken into
account to two.
First, we consider only the integer of the index, which means that we deal only with
seven dummy variables (in fact six, since the last one is redundant with the intercept).
Second, we observe that the parameters obtained for the six dummy variables
considered (d1 for the highest civil liberty and political freedom, d6 for the penultimate
lowest) are, as expected, usually declining, but with some exceptions. We give two
examples in Figure 4. We observe, however, that parameters obtained for d1 to d3 are
always high, and parameters for d4 and d5 are also significantly positive, though at
lower levels. Based on these observations, we regroup our six dummy variables into
two: d1+d2+d3, which is equal to 1 when globfree is strictly below 4, and d4+d5 which
is equal to 1 when globfree is above or equal 4, but strictly below 6. Of course, other
ways of regrouping the occurrences of globfree would be possible, but for all
regressions shown in Table 4, none predominates the one we have chosen.
Figure 4
Parameters obtained for disaggregated levels of globfree
















Note:  The bold lines represent estimates of parameters of d1 to d6. The dotted lines define the usual
confidence intervals (+ 2 standard errors).
3.2.2Self-interest of donors
−   Trade is the total bilateral trade flow (import+export) between the recipient and the
donor, expressed as percentage of the donor GDP;12
−   xxx_colo is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the recipient is a former colony of
donor xxx, and 0 otherwise;
−   USA_Egypt is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the recipient is Egypt and the
donor is USA, and 0 otherwise.
Results reported in Table 4 generally confirm our expectations. In what follows, we
interpret the size of parameters in terms of the marginal impact of each variable on
bilateral aid received. It must be kept in mind, however, that this interpretation is
quantitatively valid only when one compares two recipients who receive strictly positive
aid flows from a given donor in a given year (or a given recipient who receives positive
aid flows from a given donor at two different dates). If one of these countries does not
receive aid from this donor in this year, the marginal impact will be smaller. Moreover,
computing such marginal impacts disregards the possible interactions among our
explanatory variables. However, such an exercise is useful for assessing and comparing
the magnitude of the impact of some policy changes on aid budgets.
3.3 Results
3.3.1Beneficiary needs and policy performance variables
The income per capita has, as expected, a significantly negative impact on aid received.
The quadratic term, when positive, does not change this result since it is associated with
a very small parameter. In equations 5 and 6, an increase of GDP per capita by US$ 100
reduces aid provided by each individual donor by US$ 0.09.
The total impact is, however, much larger for a given recipient since a recipient usually
receives commitments from more than one donor. On average a country receiving aid
commitments in a given year receives assistance from close to 13 donors. This average
number of 13 effective donors for a given recipient is more or less the same in the
complete and in the reduced sample, and we use it throughout all this section whenever
applicable. This number implies here that an increase of GDP per capita by US$ 100
reduces on average total bilateral aid received by US$ 1.2.
Population size has generally the expected negative sign. However, it is not always
significant (see equations 2 and 4). Moreover, the size of its effect varies widely from
one equation to the next. This may be due to a correlation between size and policies, as
suggested in the previous section. Usually, the parameter of pop increases when we
introduce performance variables. In the most complete equation (equation 6), an
increase of size by one million reduces aid given by an average donor by US$ 0.006,
and therefore total bilateral aid by US$ 0.1 (assuming again the number of bilateral
contributors to be 13 donors). Except for very large countries, the quadratic term is,
again, of second order, and does not change drastically the marginal impact of
population on aid received per capita. For the largest countries (India and China) with a
population around one billion, the quadratic term reduces significantly this impact, but
does not reverse it.
Lagged growth has the expected positive sign in all regressions. However, in the most
complete equation, this impact losses significance. This is not due to the shrinking of
the sample imposed by missing observations for social data, since when we re-estimate
equation 1 or 2 on the limited sample (14,317 observations), lagged growth has a very13
Table 4
Estimation of the full-sample model
  Equation1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
RGDPcap -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
 (-4.457) (-4.862) (-1.175) (-2.009) (-5.790) (-5.795) 
RGDPcap² -4.88E-08*** -4.23E-08*** -6.82E-08*** -5.40E-08*** 9.29E-09 9.29E-09
(-4.824) (-4.166) (-5.798) (-4.562) (0.547) (0.548)
Pop -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.006***
 (-2.926) (-1.614) (-3.286) (-1.159) (-2.970) (-2.958) 
Pop² 2.72E-06** 1.15E-06 3.06E06 6.47E07 4.18E-06** 4.34E-06**
(1.918) (0.797) (2.274)** (0.470) (2.146) (2.171)
trade 490.4*** 482.7*** 425.7*** 408.2*** 190.0** 189.4***
 (12.751) (12.578) (11.896) (11.449) (4.164) (4.148) 
Fr_colo 11.54*** 11.65*** 11.49*** 11.69*** 12.15*** 12.14***
 (24.055) (24.105) (24.99) (24.351) (19.674) (19.629) 
UK_colo 8.52*** 8.46*** 7.83*** 7.74*** 5.47*** 5.47***
 (21.316) (21.141) (20.617) (20.487) (10.606) (10.582) 
Prt_colo 12.18*** 12.15*** 12.11*** 12.06*** 5.28** 5.29** 
 (8.958) (8.95) (9.27) (9.208) (2.403) (2.407) 
Spa_colo 2.546*** 2.701*** 2.30*** 2.54*** -1.32 -1.33 
 (2.754) (2.923) (2.65) (2.922) (-0.829) (-0.836) 
USA_Egypt 25.61*** 25.62*** 25.28*** 25.30*** 48.5*** 48.6***
 (12.211) (12.234) (12.796) (12.787) (18.478) (18.474) 
Globfree<4 1.81*** 1.74*** 1.27*** 1.17*** 2.06*** 2.08***
 (12.235) (11.771) (8.705) (8.026) (9.403) (9.265) 
4<Globfree<6 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.82*** 0.82***
 (4.744) (4.852) (3.388) (3.439) (4.032) (4.046) 
Growth[-1] 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.021 0.020 
 (4.048) (4.132) (3.198) (3.179) (1.568) (1.564) 
FDI 0.002 -0.006 0.096*** 0.099***
 (0.167) (-0.565) (3.307) (3.311) 
Primary 0.003 0.003
  (0.836) (0.830) 
Inf. mortality -0.009*** -0.009***
  (-2.921) (-2.936) 
Aid_others 0.0062*** 0.010*** -0.0009
 (5.382) (7.943) (-0.353) 
intercept -4.014*** -4.196*** -3.734*** -3.977*** -1.39** -1.35**
 (-25.953) (-26.402) (-24.324) (-24.98) (-2.429) (-2.320) 
No. of obs 42,134  42,134  39,714  39,714  14,317  14,317 
Censored 18313 18313 16667 16667 6068 6068 
Rho 0.29  0.29 0.30 0.30  0.29  0.29 
Notes: Method of estimation: Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time x donor);
Rho = standard deviation of the random-effects/ standard deviation of residual;
t-statistics in brackets;
*** = significant at 1% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level;
ll tests for random-effect specification passed at 1% level (not shown).
significant positive parameter (regression not shown). An inspection of data shows that
lagged growth is significantly and positively correlated with FDI, which corresponds to
the fact that foreign investors are sensitive to growth performances. Moreover, it is also
significantly and positively correlated with primary enrolment: countries where policies
favour education are also promoting growth, and the fact that growth is lagged here14
does not change this relation much, since primary enrolment policies do not change fast.
In any case, the impact of growth is moderate. Assuming a parameter around 0.036 (as
in equations 1 and 2) would mean that a growth acceleration by 1 percentage point
would increase total bilateral aid on average by less than US$ 0.5.
FDI has the expected positive sign and is highly significant in equations 5 and 6. Again,
the divergence of these results with equations 3 and 4, where FDI is not significant,
corresponds to the positive correlation between lagged growth and FDI. If a country
attracts new FDI flows equal to 1 per cent of its GDP, this would increase the aid flows
it receives from the bilateral aid community by US$  1.2. This is not at all a small
complement, given that such FDI flows are equivalent on average to US$ 7.2 (at 1985
prices).
The social policy outcome variables, primary enrolment rate and infant mortality rate,
have the expected signs, respectively, positive and negative. Primary enrolment
significance is very low, but again this is linked to its correlation with lagged growth.
The same regression as in equation 6, estimated without the lagged growth variable,
exhibits a doubling of the parameter for primary enrolment, which becomes significant
at the 1 per cent level (regression not shown). According to equation 6 parameters, a
decrease of infant mortality rate by 10‰, corresponds to an increase of total bilateral
aid received by about US$  1.2. Of course, the various dimensions of poverty are
interrelated and social achievements such as higher primary enrolment or lower infant
mortality may be correlated with an alleviation of monetary poverty, which on average
reduces aid flows. There is no mechanical relation between income per capita and social
achievements but in some circumstances this may partially explain why some countries,
like Mauritius, have continuously obtained a high level of aid per capita despite their
relatively high income per capita.
Civil liberty and political freedom have a strongly positive and significant impact on aid
flows. Overall, countries which have an average mark better than 4 (34 to 40 per cent of
the sample) receive from the bilateral donor community US$ 27 more than those with a
mark equal or worse than 6, and US$ 16 more than those with a mark between 4 and
5.5. Countries with a mark between 4 and 5.5 still receive US$ 11 more than those with
the worst marks. These numbers are quite large, and suggest that the best way for a
developing country to obtain better assistance from the donor community is to adopt
democratic institutions.
Finally, aid received from other donors has only a marginal and unequally significant
impact. It is even negative in equation 6. Moreover, introducing this variable does not
change the magnitude of the impact of other variables. Therefore, there is no clear
evidence of coordination among donors.
3.3.2Self-interest of donors
Bilateral trade has a strong and significantly positive impact on aid allocation. Its
magnitude depends however quite a lot on the equation specifications. Part of this large
variance of its estimates observed in Table 4 comes from changes in sample size. We
show below that its impact is increasing over time (contrary to what could be suggested
by our simple univariate descriptive statistics in the previous section). Since the sample
available for estimating the most complete equations (equations 6 and 7) contains less
recent data that the full complete sample, this may explain part of the decline. As a
matter of fact, equation 2 re-estimated on the small sample exhibits a parameter for15
trade equivalent to the estimate reported in equation 6 (regression not shown). However,
the magnitude of the effect of trade intensity on aid commitments is rather small in all
cases, because bilateral trade flows between DAC members and developing countries
are small: on average, bilateral trade intensity ratios represent only 0.04 per cent of
donor GDPs, equivalent to US$  200 million. On average, an increase by US$  100
million in the bilateral trade between a given donor and a given recipient will only
increase the donor aid flow to the recipient by US$ 0.04 per capita, given the parameter
reported in equation 6. This is equivalent to US$ 1.2 million, given an average recipient
population of 30 million. These numbers suggest that the magnitude of aid flows that
may be stimulated by trade relations, although significant, is quite small.
Former colonial links have a much bigger impact on aid flows. Although parameters
vary among equations, magnitudes are consistently high. According to equation 6
estimates, France gives on average an extra US$ 12 per capita in aid flow to its former
colonies. For United Kingdom, we get the much smaller number of US$ 5 per capita,
but this is still a rather large amount. The privileged assistance policy enjoyed by Egypt
from the United States provides the country with an even bigger aid bonus of US$ 49
(but only 26 in equations 1 to 4). Such numbers are quite consistent with descriptive
data discussed earlier.
Estimates for the colonial dummies of Portugal and Spain are less consistent, but this is
due to lack of information in the sample available to estimate equation 6. According to
DAC data, these two countries have started providing aid only recently (in the 1990s),
which means that the estimates for their former colonial relationship dummies are
computed only on the 1990s data. The small sample available to estimate equation 6 has
too few data available for the 1990s to allow for a robust estimation of these parameters.
Similar problems are encountered when re-fitting equation 2 on this sample (regression
not shown). Equations 1 to 4 may provide better estimates of these parameters, and
suggest that past colonial links result in aid bonuses of about US$ 12 per capita for
former Portuguese colonies and US$ 2 for former Spanish colonies.
4 Changes over time
One of the advantages of the large database that we have assembled is that it gives the
possibility of discussing the evolution of aid policies over the past two decades. In this
section, we address two questions:
−   What has been the impact of donor policy changes on the evolution of aid volumes
over time?
−   Did donors behave differently during the 1990s decade after the end of the cold
war?
Observing raw data suggests that aid volumes have declined over the period under
review. However, we want to know whether this decline is simply the result of changes
in budgetary allocation policies in donor countries, or of changes in the beneficiary
specific characteristics or in their policies and performance.
Since we have introduced time random-effects (interacted with donor random-effects),
the residuals of our equation contain information on such changes in aid volumes that16
are ‘autonomous’, i.e. that do not depend on the observable characteristics of the
recipients. Therefore, in order to assess the autonomous changes in aid volumes, we
propose to aggregate, on a yearly basis (both on donors and on recipients) the residuals
of our regression.
More precisely, an easily computable measure of the estimator of the dependent
variable is:
) , 0 ( Bx Max y= 
Where  x is the vector of explanatory variables and B the matrix of corresponding
estimated parameters. However, it should be kept in mind that this is a biased estimator
of y since:
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Therefore, the corresponding computed residual,  y y  − , is an overestimation of the true
one. In order to obtain the true residuals, it would be necessary to compute the above
integral with stochastic simulations for all observations. However, this is unnecessary
for our exercise. For a given donor, j, the aggregated computed residual (aggregated
over recipients indexed by the i’s ) is equal to:
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Taking into account the fact that, by definition, vj,t is independent of xi,j,t and of ui,j,t, this
expression is increasing with vj,t, simply because Max(0,a+z) is an increasing function of
z, whatever the value of a. Therefore, if this donor is reducing its aggregate aid effort
(which means that its vj,t is decreasing over time), the aggregated computed residual will
be declining as well. If we aggregate these expressions among all donors, again the
aggregated computed residual will increase if donors have a common drift in their vj,t.
Therefore, in order to test whether the observed decline in total aid budgets is due to a
reduction of aid efforts by donors instead of a change in our explanatory variables, we
propose to use this imperfect, but easily computed, measure of residuals.
Moreover, not all recipients have the same population. Thus, in computing the
aggregates, we need to weight each observation by the corresponding recipient
population. Therefore, we compute :
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which is again decreasing if donors have a common downward drift in their aid efforts.17
Figure 5
Comparison of aggregate residuals for the 1980s and the 1990s











Figure 5 illustrates the results when each recipient residual is weighted by its
population. A caveat is that social data, which are necessary to estimate the full model
(equation 6), are not available on a yearly basis for a large number of countries.
Therefore, residuals are computed here with equation 2, instead of equation 6, in order
to be able to obtain a sufficiently complete timeseries of residuals.
Figure 5 is quite explicit. First, the aggregate estimator is slowly but surely increasing
over time, which means that the observed declining trend of aid budgets cannot be
explained by recipient policies and performance. The aggregate residual presents
moreover a steep downward drift in the second half of the 1990s decade, which is
responsible for the accelerated decline of aggregate aid flows; part of this decline has
been mitigated by improvements in recipient policies, but the end result has been a
dramatic decline of US$ 14.8 billion (on average 6.7 per cent a year) in total bilateral
aid budgets over the 1990s.
The peak year of 1990 is, however, biased by a substantial increase of aid commitment
by the US to Egypt in the context of the Gulf War, and much of the peak (US$ 8.2
billion out of US$ 9.3) reflects this. If this effect is cleaned out, the steady decline of aid
budgets starts in 1989, i.e., at the end of the cold war, whereas it had a flat trend
between 1980 and 1988. Therefore, the decline in aid budgets attributable to the end of
the cold war should be calculated from 1988 instead of 1990. With this correction, total
aid budgets have fallen by ‘only’ 4 per cent a year (see dotted line in Figure 5).
Therefore, whatever the way we assess it, our results suggest that a major outcome of
the end of the cold war has been the strong decline in aid commitments of bilateral
donors. Part of this decline is due to aid transfers to transition economies, since our
database covers only ‘Part I’ recipients of the DAC, i.e. it includes only the poorest
transition economies. However, this substitution effect explains only a minor part of the
decline. Throughout the 1993-99 period, annual aid commitments to ‘Part II’18
Table 5
Comparison of the full-sample model for the 1980s and the 1990s
 1980s  1990s   1990s-1980s
RGDPcap -0.00139*** -0.0012*** 0.0001
(-7.014) (-4.555)*** (0.31)
RGDPcap² 2.68E-08 6.04E-08** 3.36E-08
 (1.132) (1.938) (0.922)
Pop -0.011*** -0.003 -0.01**
(-4.057) (-1.048) (-1.97)
Pop² 1.01E-05*** 9.54E-07 -9.146E-06**
 (3.462) (0.330) (-2.414) 
Trade 106.79** 514.27*** 407.48***
 (2.112) (4.599) (3.36) 
Fr_colo 14.15*** 10.87*** -3.28**
 (16.176) (11.300) (-2.53) 
UK_colo 5.28*** 4.39*** -0.89 
 (5.245) (6.357) (0.728) 
Prt_colo 6.44***  
 (2.600)  
Spa_colo 0.141  
 (1.29)  
USA_Egypt 23.79*** 79.92*** 56.13***
 (6.899) (20.038) (10.64) 
Globfree<4 3.18*** 1.48*** -1.7***
 (10.120) (4.495) (3.794) 
4<Globfree<6 1.59*** 0.36 -1.228**
 (5.712) (1.189) (-3.036) 
Growth[-1] -0.021 0.070*** 0.092***
 (-1.279) (3.154) (3.277) 
FDI 0.475*** 0.0078 -0.467***
 (7.251) (0.227) (6.309) 
Inf.mortality -0.0117*** -0.0157*** -0.004 
 (-3.291) (-3.826) (-1.034) 
Primary -0.0043 0.0098* 0.014** 
 (-0.977) (1.815) (2.215) 
Aid_others -0.0129*** -0.0007 0.0126**
 (-3.730) (-0.066) (2.269) 
Intercept -0.859 -0.859  
 (-1.383) (-1.383)  
No. of obs 14,317 14,317    
Censored 6,068 6,068  
Rho 0.28 0.28    
Notes: Method of estimation: Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time x donor);
Rho = standard deviation of the random-effects/ standard deviation of residual; t-statistics in
brackets;
*** = significant at 1% level;
**  = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level;
All tests for random-effect specification passed at 1% level (not shown).
transitional economies have been about US$ 2.0 billion, i.e. only 20 per cent of the
autonomous decline of aid budgets observed during the 1990s decade.
The end of the cold war may have also changed the structural behaviours of donors, and
trends in the residual estimates, therefore, provide only a partial picture of the recent
evolution. In Table 5, we provide a test of structural breaks in the parameter of our
model from the 1980s to the 1990s. This test is performed on equation 6, with of course19
no estimation for the dummies for former Portuguese and Spanish colonies in the first
decade, when no positive commitments are observed. This test suggests a number of
significant changes in parameters, but the overall picture is rather mixed, both for
beneficiary needs and policy performance variables and for the self-interest variables of
the donors.
4.1 Beneficiary needs and policy performance variables
The decrease of the parameter for the recipient income per capita suggests that donors
take less notice of beneficiary needs in the 1990s. This is consistent with our
observation in section 2 of a shrinking of the redistributive impact of aid policies among
recipients over time. This change, however, is not significant. Similarly, changes in the
parameters for social policy outcome variables are not significant, which, however, may
be due to the relative scarcity of information on social data in the 1990s.
As for economic performances, mixed results are obtained. Lagged growth, which has a
negative parameter in the 1980s, becomes positive and significant in the 1990s,
suggesting that donors give more recognition for good economic policies in the 1990s
than in the 1980s. This is consistent with the current policy statements by several
donors, who tend to increasingly adopt selectivity policies. However, a reverse change
is observed for FDI, which is non-significant in the 1990s but has a large positive and
significant parameter in the 1980s. Given the instability of estimates observed for the
parameter of FDI, the latter result must, however, be interpreted with caution.
Concerning political attitudes of the recipients, we obtain a significant decrease in the
size of parameters for our civil liberty and political freedom variables. In the context of
the cold war, adopting democratic institutions was often synonymous with joining the
western bloc. This may provide an explanation for the result observed.
4.2 Self-interest of donors
The size of parameters for colonial dummies decreases from the 1980s to the 1990s.
This is consistent with the assumption that the end of the cold war would have reduced
the role of patronage policies by some donors. For USA and Egypt, the estimated
parameter becomes much higher. This is due to the big, but short-lived, increase of aid
that Egypt received in 1990-91 in recognition of its attitude during the Gulf War.
Overall, aid given to Egypt by the Americans was large in the 1980s, following the
Camp David Peace Accord with Israel, but its trend declined afterward, despite the Gulf
War peak. In 1999, American aid to Egypt was only one-sixth of what it was in 1980.
Conversely, the size and significance of the parameter for bilateral trade intensity
increases quite a lot from the 1980s to the 1990s. This suggests that aid is still
influenced by the self-interest of donors, but in a different manner: while in the 1980s it
was based on politics and history, it is influenced more by donors’ pragmatic
considerations about commercial interests. This is observed, for instance, in France,
which has started giving assistance to countries beyond its traditional clientele, in order
to try to create better links to countries with greater commercial potential.20
5 Comparisons among donors
In this section, we attempt the same comparison exercise by donor instead of by decade,
based on equation 6. Despite the large size of our database, an overall comparison of
behaviour by donor proves to be difficult, due to the scarcity of observations with
complete information. New donors (Greece, Portugal and Spain) as well as Luxembourg
do not have enough uncensored data to allow an estimation of equation 6. Among the
remaining 18 donors, seven (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden) have uncensored data for about 50 per cent or less of the recipients
with complete information, leaving about 300 or less observations for parameter
estimation. Another three countries (Austria, Belgium and Switzerland) have positive aid
commitments for only two-third to three-quarters of available observations. Because of
the relatively small size of their aid budgets, these donors tend to specialize on a limited
number of recipients. In this sense, they behave differently from other donors in a
significant way, but this also implies that estimations of their behavioural parameters may
lack robustness.
Our principal goal here, however, is to test parameter differences among donors, instead
of producing an aid allocation equation for each and every donor. To this end, we estimate
an equation for each donor where explanatory variables are those included in equation 6
together with the same variables multiplied by a dummy for this donor. This equation may
be written as follows, to test parameter differences between a donor j0 and other donors:
) 1 , 0 ( , , , , , , , , ,
0 0
t j t j i t j i j j j t j i t j i v u x Bx Max y + + + =
= β
This equation provides both donor-specific parameter estimates (
0 j B β + ) and a direct test
of differences of individual parameters between the considered donor and the group of
other donors (based on estimates of 
0 j β  and their associated pseudo-students). In
Table  6, we report (for all 18 donors for whom data availability was sufficient to
perform the tests) the sign and significance level of donor-specific parameters obtained
from this estimation procedure, while Table 7 provides tests of heterogeneity of
parameters between each donor and the average other donors. Numerical results are
provided in Appendix 2.
5.1 Beneficiary needs and policy performance variables
Although the impact of GDP per capita is, as expected, significantly negative for most
donors, its magnitude varies a lot among donors. It has the wrong sign for Australia,
Canada, Germany, United Kingdom and Unites States, and significantly so for the latter.
Considering the quadratic terms does not change the overall picture, given that their
magnitude is of second order. This suggests that these donors take less note of the
income poverty of the recipients. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they do
not care about poverty in the potential recipient countries when making their aid
allocation decisions. All of them, with the exception of United States, exhibit a
significantly higher than average parameter for infant mortality, which could mean that
they care more about non-monetary dimensions of poverty than about its monetary
component. This is true in particular for Germany, which increases its aid commitment
to potential recipients by US$ 0.04 when they have infant mortality rates higher by 1‰21
(with a significant parameter), while other donors provide on average the same increase
of aid for a reduction of income per capita by US$ 40.
The previous analysis suggests that considering the infant mortality rate as a social
policy performance variable, which would positively influence aid allocation policies,
may be wrong in some circumstances, when considered by donors as a major indicator
of recipient needs. This seems to be the case not only for Germany but also for Italy
and, although with non-significant parameters, for Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Netherlands and United Kingdom. Similar results show up with respect to primary
school enrolment, which has a significantly negative, instead of positive, parameter for
Australia and Belgium, and a negative (although non-significant) parameter for Austria,
Finland, Switzerland and the US.
Comforting results are obtained with respect to the dummy variables for civil liberty and
political freedom, which have significantly positive parameters for most of the donors.
The US and Australia value democracy more than other donors, with a democracy bonus
5 and 7.5 times, respectively, higher than for the average donor. According to our
parameter estimates, being democratic (as compared to dictatorial) brings close to US$ 8
more American aid per capita, and US$ 11 more in Australian aid. Two donors—France
and Belgium—go in the other direction with negative (although most of the time non-
significant) parameters for the democracy dummies. These two donors have consistently
given large amounts of aid to several African non-democratic recipients whom they have
financially supported for most of the period under review, although such biases have
receded in the 1990s (regression not shown). Everything being equal, France has given
the same amount of assistance to democracies and dictatorial regimes, and significantly
less (about US$  2) to potential recipients with medium marks. Belgium has granted
slightly more aid to dictatorships than to other potential recipients.
Finally, the analysis of economic performance variables leads to somewhat mixed results.
Few donors have significantly positive parameters for either FDI or lagged growth, or
both. The most striking result is a significantly negative parameter of the United States for
both lagged growth and FDI. It seems that American assistance has been geared rather
exclusively to countries with good civil liberty and political freedom, whatever their
economic performances. The United States may have also given support to post-conflict
countries with improving political behaviours, but with initially slow growth and
investment attractiveness.
5.2 Self-interest of donors
Dummy variables for past colonial links already took account of the differences among
donors regarding their self-interest behaviours. Tables 6 and 7 complement this with
respect to the impact of the trade intensity variable. Overall, the results reported there
suggest a wide diversity of aid allocation policies. Australia, Austria and New Zealand
give more assistance to their trading partners. The same is true, although with less
significance, for a number of small donors, such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy and
Japan. Conversely, it seems that large donors (except Japan) do not care about allocating
more assistance to their trading partners. Small donors tend to specialize their aid policies
geographically, which makes sense because they cannot provide assistance to all potential
recipients, and they do so by targeting their trading partners.22
Table 6
Estimated parameters by donor
  RGDPcap RGDPcap² Pop Pop² trade globfree <4 4<globfree <6 growth[-1] FDI Primary enrlt Inf. mortality Aid_others
Australia --- --- +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ---
Austria ++ + ++ -
Belgium --- ++ - --- --
Canada ++ + ++ -
Denmark - ++ +++ ++
Finland + - +
France --- - ++ +++
Germany -- ++ - ++ +++ ++
Ireland --- ++ + + -
Italy -- +++ -- + ++ +++ --
Japan ++ ++ + +++ + -
Netherlands +
New Zealand -- +++ --- +++ +++ ++ ---
Norway -- ++ +
Sweden +++ -- ++
Switzerland -- ---
UK - -- ++ ++ + +++
USA +++ --- --- +++ +++ +++ --- -- --- +++
Table 7
Differences of parameters with others, by donor
 RGDPcap RGDPcap² Pop Pop² trade globfree    <4 4< globfree <6 growth[-1] FDI Primary enrlt Inf. mortality Aid_others
Australia + --- --- ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ --- ++
Austria + -
Belgium --- --- -- --- --
Canada +++ +++ +++
Denmark ++ + +
Finland +++ --
France -- --- --- ++ +
Germany -- ++ +++ +++
Ireland + +- -
Italy +++ ++ +++ -- 
Japan ++ +
Netherlands - -- ++ +
New Zealand +++ --- +++ + ---
Norway +
Sweden + -- ++ ++
Switzerland + - --- - ++ --
UK +++ - --- ++ ++ +++
USA +++ --- --- +++ -- +++ ++ --- --- -  +++
Notes to Tables 6 and 7: Method of estimation: Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time x donor); +++ (---) = significant positive (negative) at 1% level;




It might be possible that our results depend on the method of estimation used. A number of
authors consider the two-step method to be more valid than a Tobit estimation, since it does
not assume that explanatory variables affect the same way the probability of getting aid and
the amount of aid received.
Table 8
Estimation of the Probit model
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
RGDPcap 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
 (-22.419) (-21.408) (-20.047) (-17.953) (0.000) (-9.589) 
RGDPcap² 1.17E-08*** 8.95E-09*** 1.61E-08*** 1.12E-08*** 7.95E-09*** 8.91E-09***
 (8.667) (6.486) (8.944) (6.154) (0.000) (2.628) 
Pop 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
 (28.983) (23.608) (26.599) (21.265) (12.219) (9.553) 
Pop² -7.33E-08*** -6.17E-08*** -6.79E-08*** -5.60E-08*** -5.20E-08*** -4.26E-08***
 (-26.949) (-22.115) (-24.601) (-19.788) (-11.255) (-8.987) 
Trade 83.9*** 88.9*** 76.4*** 80.7*** 33.1*** 27.8***
 (12.778) (6.591) (11.145) (11.819) (3.315) (2.858) 
Fr_colo 7.40 7.54 7.58 8.07 8.28 7.89 
 ………………  
UK_colo 0.48*** 0.62*** 1.06*** 1.19*** 9.34 9.23 
 (3.516) (4.077) (6.493) (7.514) … … 
Prt_colo 1.59*** 1.58*** 1.67*** 1.55*** 1.08*** 1.20***
 (8.538) (8.540) (8.786) (8.543) (3.171) (3.499) 
Spa_colo 0.84*** 0.77*** 0.88*** 0.72*** 0.48* 0.47*
 (6.750) (6.274) (7.127) (5.713) (1.918) (1.905) 
USA_Egypt 6.58 6.96 6.65 7.24 7.15 6.88 
………………  
Globfree<4 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.45***
 (8.020) (9.928) (5.958) (7.142) (7.595) (9.438) 
4<Globfree<6 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.26*** 0.29***
 (9.315) (0.023) (6.990) (6.586) (6.112) (6.716) 
Growth[-1] 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
 (9.181) (8.975) (7.673) (7.719) (5.227) (5.225) 
FDI -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.021***
 (-12.263) (-10.993) (-5.546) (-3.534) 
Primary 0.001* 0.001 
  (1.868) (1.577) 
Inf. mortality -0.001 -0.001**
  (-1.039) (-1.994) 
Aid_others -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005***
 (-18.324) (-15.685) (-9.340) 
Intercept 0.306*** 0.424*** 0.428*** 0.482*** 0.425*** 0.699***
  (13.709) (17.883) (17.088) (17.664)  (3.435)  (5.531) 
No.  of  obs 42,134 42,134 39,714 39,714 14,317 14,317 
   
Rho 0.5545 0.5627  0.5793845 0.5192 0.6145 0.6296 
Notes: Method of estimation: Random-effects Probit model (random-effect time x donor);
t-statistics in brackets;
*** = significant at 1% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level.24
Table 9
Estimation of the linear aid allocation model on positive observations
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4  Equation 5  Equation 6 
RGDPcap 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*
 (6.797) (5.251) (8.718) (6.151) (-2.158) (-1.777) 
RGDPcap² -1.32E-07*** -9.22E-08*** -1.53E-07*** -9.84E-08*** -5.30E-09 -4.01E-09 
 (-7.952) (-5.558) (-10.155) (-6.511) (-0.253) (-0.192) 
Pop -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
 (-13.188) (-8.271) (-14.982) (-8.349) (-7.730) (-6.231) 
Pop² 2.37E-07*** 1.56E-07*** 2.00E-07*** 1.17E-07*** 1.41E-07*** 1.18E-07***
 (11.540) (7.445) (12.970) (7.474) (6.492) (5.307) 
Trade 154.6*** 91.4* 178.8*** 99.3*** 74.8 81.8*
 (2.638) (1.567) (4.027) (2.256) (1.368) (1.498) 
Fr_colo 12.33*** 13.04*** 12.10*** 12.91*** 12.31*** 12.51***
 (19.645) (20.871) (24.529) (26.548) (18.343) (18.629) 
UK_colo 6.80*** 6.28*** 6.39*** 5.75*** 3.77*** 3.64***
 (13.945) (12.948) (15.859) (14.534) (6.811) (6.577) 
Prt_colo 3.82* 3.82* 3.83*** 3.81*** 1.75 1.74 
 (1.597) (1.610) (2.115) (2.134) (0.467) (0.465) 
Spa_colo -1.69 -0.99 -1.22 -0.58 -0.12 0.03 
 (-1.034) (-0.608) (-0.971) (-0.470) (-0.038) (0.008) 
USA_Egypt 27.09*** 27.36*** 25.25*** 25.74*** 48.82*** 48.87***
 (9.580) (9.743) (11.980) (12.340) (17.827) (17.863) 
Globfree<4 1.01*** 0.82*** 1.07*** 0.85*** 1.62*** 1.38***
 (4.375) (3.566) (5.996) (4.772) (6.238) (5.228) 
4<Globfree<6 -0.51*** -0.38* -0.13 -0.06 0.22 0.13 
 (-2.339) (-1.752) (-0.750) (-0.368) (0.906) (0.553) 
Growth[-1] -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.012 -0.013 -0.021 -0.018 
 (-2.607) (-2.603) (-1.015) (-1.111) (-1.281) (-1.144) 
FDI 0.109*** 0.085*** 0.312*** 0.274***
 (7.572) (5.999) (7.767) (6.711) 
Primary -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.727) (-0.675) 
Inf. mortality *** -0.010*** -0.009***
  (-2.685) (-2.471) 
Aid_others 0.040*** 0.045 0.015***
 (18.235) (23.391) (4.622) 
Intercept 1.740*** 0.664*** 0.963*** -0.027 3.056*** 2.525***
  (8.169) (3.026) (5.516)  (-0.151) (4.554) (3.714) 
Notes: Method of estimation: Random-effects linear model (random-effect time x donor); t-statistics in brackets;
*** = significant at 1% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level.
We have estimated the probit model, which determines the probability of receiving aid, using
the same explanatory variables as before and the same assumptions concerning the random
specific effects. The results are reported in Table 8. Overall, results are not much different
than in the Tobit estimation, insofar as the sign of parameters are the same, with only two
exceptions:
−   Aid received from other donors now has a significantly negative sign, while we
concluded from the Tobit estimate that this variable has no robust impact on the amount
of aid received; however, such a result is difficult to interpret.25
−   The FDI received also has a significantly negative sign. Again, this is a variable on
which we concluded to a lack of robustness of our estimates, and interpreting its
negative sign here is not straightforward.
A second issue we have with the probit estimation reported here is that it has not been
possible to estimate the standard deviation of the parameters for the dummy USEgypt and
Frcolo and, to a certain extent, Gbcolo. This is a numerical problem, linked to the fact that the
qualitative information conveyed by the existence or absence of aid is not sufficient to allow a
full estimation.
Overall, despite some differences with the Tobit, this experiment suggests that the probit does
not contradict our results, and when it does so, it is not clear that the results provided by the
probit are more credible than those obtained with the Tobit.
The second exercise that we attempted consists of estimating aid received based on strictly
positive observations. Then there is no truncation, and we can estimate a linear model. Again,
we have done so by using the same list of explanatory variables as before and applying the
same assumptions concerning the random-specific effects. Results are reported in Table 9.
As we could expect, these estimates have quite different properties from the Tobit estimates.
We know that, in theory, there is a selection bias in this estimation. This bias shows up for
several variables:
−   There is a positive and significant impact of GDP per capita, instead of a negative effect;
this result has no logical interpretation, since it would imply that the richer a recipient
country is, the bigger are its aid receipts;
−   The dummies for democracy have much small parameters than in the Tobit estimation,
and even negative parameters in some equations for the dummy for medium levels of
democracy (which would imply that authoritarian regimes get more aid than semi-
democratic regimes); and
−   Lagged growth has always a negative sign, which would mean that bad economic
policies are rewarded.
All in all, these results cast some doubt on the accuracy of a linear estimation.
7 Conclusion
The database that we have assembled provides a wealth of information and analysis on aid
allocation policies implemented by bilateral donors over the 1980s and 1990s decades. Our
analysis identifies a number of variables, describing both recipients’ needs and performances,
as well as the donors’ self-interests, which have influenced assistance policies. Given the
amount of information available, we have also been able to compare aid policies before and
after the end of the cold war, and among donors. Our conclusions are as follows:
-  Aid budgets have faced an autonomous declining trend at a rate of more than 6 per
cent a year, in real terms, since the end of the cold war;26
-  Overall, aid is progressive, although with a declining intensity over time;
-  Although with a declining intensity, the best way to attract bilateral assistance is to go
democratic. This is particularly true with regard to the American and Australian
assistance;
-  Post-colonial traditional links still have a strong, but declining over time, influence on
aid allocation policies of the former colonial ruling countries;
-  Trade linkages have conversely a growing impact, although still with a small
magnitude;
-  Small donors, who need to specialize because of the small size of their aid budgets,
tend to target their trading partners more than big donors, with the exception of Japan;
-  On average, donors condition their assistance on positive social performances of the
recipients, particularly after the end of the cold war, but some donors prefer to provide
aid to countries with the biggest social needs;
-  Good economic performances have on average been rewarded by donors in the 1990s.
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Appendix 1: List and sources of variables
Variable Definition Source
Aidcap Total real ODA (OA) Commitments divided by
the population of the recipient country
OECD Development Aid Committee
database (international development
statistics)
Aid_others Total of AIDCAP given by other donors to the
recipient country
Authors own calculation
RGDPcap Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars
(international prices, base year 1985) of the
recipient countries
Penn World Tables
Pop Population expressed in millions, total World Bank’s Global Development Finance
& World Development Indicators
Growth[-1] GDP growth (annual %) of the recipient lagged
one period
World Bank’s Global Development Finance
& World Development Indicators
FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP of the
recipient)
World Bank’s Global Development Finance
& World Development Indicators
Inf. mortality Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) World Bank’s Development Finance &
World Development Indicators
Primary enrlt School enrolment, primary (% gross). World Bank’s Global Development Finance
& World Development Indicators
Trade Sum of bilateral imports and exports (corrected
for the OECD inflation) in % of donor’s GDP
OECD trade database
xxx_colo Dummy variable equal to 1 when the recipient is
a former colony of the donor, and 0 otherwise.
Authors own estimates
USA_Egypt Dummy variable equal to 1 when the recipient is
Egypt and the donor is USA, and 0 otherwise
Authors own estimates
Globfree Mean of civil liberties and political right indexes,
ranging from 1 (most free countries) to 7 (less
free countries)
Freedom House website29
Appendix 2: Comparison of estimations by donor
Others Australia Australia-Others Others Austria Austria-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** 0.0007 0.0016* -0.0010*** -0.0009 0.0001
(-5.680) (0.771) (1.772) (-5.882) (-1.314) (0.031)
GDPcap² 1.8E-08 -3.87E-07*** -4.05E-07*** 9.39E-09 6.07E-08 5.13E-08
(1.056) (-3.313) (-3.439) (0.542) (0.820) (0.678)
Pop -0.004** -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.007*** 0.006 0.013
(-1.928) (-4.868) (4.284) (-3.264) (0.701) (1.431)
Pop² 2.55E-06 2.43E-05*** 2.175E-05** 5.03E-06** -7.38E-06 -1.24E-05
(1.270) (2.907) (2.534) (2.451) (-0.860) (-1.407)
Trade 85.93* 3572.11*** 3486.17*** 185.19*** 1018.38** 833.18*
(1.872) (12.212) (11.773) (4.032) (2.187) (1.780)
1<Globfree<4 1.5610*** 11.6223*** 10.0613*** 2.1235*** 1.5908* -0.5327
(6.967) (11.512) (9.758) (9.225) (1.640) (-0.538)
4<Globfree<6 0.6758*** 3.4895*** 2.8137*** 0.7833*** 1.7667** 0.9835
(3.323) (3.695) (2.921) (3.747) (2.023) (1.100)
Growth (-1) 0.0146 0.0186 0.0039 0.0205 0.0318 0.0114
(1.090) (0.517) (0.000) (1.489) (0.517) (0.173)
FDI 0.0227 1.1726*** 1.1499*** 0.1122*** -0.1367 -0.2489*
(0.741) (9.231) (8.802) (3.661) (-1.056) (-1.870)
Primary 0.0060* -0.0479*** -0.0539*** 0.0035 -0.0075 -0.0110
(1.662) (-3.372) (-3.763) (0.942) (-0.561) (-0.812)
Infant mort. -0.0087*** 0.0065 0.0152** -0.0094*** -0.0140* -0.0046
(-2.768) (0.787) (1.916) (-2.931) (-1.849) (-0.640)
Aidothers 0.0011 -0.0116 -0.0127 -0.0006 -0.0063 -0.0057











Intercept -1.3725** -1.3725** -1.2976** -1.2976**
(-2.411) (2.411) (-2.223) (-2.223)
No. of obs 14,317 654 14,317 654
Censored 6,068 305 6,068 225
Rho 0.2963 0.2963 0.2968 0.2968
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Appendix 2 (continued)
Others Belgium Belgium-Others Others Canada Canada-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0013** -0.0004 -0.0010*** 0.0004768 0.0015***
(-5.507) (-1.97) (-0.6325) (-6.178) (0.842) (2.587)
GDPcap² 6.70E-09 5.26E-08 4.59E-08 1.51E-08 -7.50E-08 -9.01E-08
(0.386) (0.67) (0.5745) (0.857) (-1.226) (-1.425)
Pop -0.006*** 0.005 0.011 -0.005*** -0.013* -0.0081
(-3.123) (0.566) (1.2570) (-2.668) (-1.666) (-0.970)
Pop² 4.89E-06** -6.38E-06 -1.127E-05 3.88E-06** 1.25E-05 8.62E-06
(2.382) (-0.732) (-1.2610) (1.885) (1.519) (1.020)
Trade 181.4065*** 195.0755** 13.6690 199.27*** -129.5056 -328.7787
(3.19) (2.332) (0.1414) (4.321) (-0.364) (-0.917)
1<Globfree<4 2.2835*** -1.3046 -3.5881*** 2.07*** 2.0874** 0.0173
(9.902) (-1.384) (-3.7081) (8.950) (2.393) (0.000)
4<Globfree<6 0.9527*** -1.2950 -2.2478*** 0.783*** 1.4583* 0.6750
(4.548) (-1.533) (-2.5904) (3.723) (1.857) (0.837)
Growth (-1) 0.0183 0.0829 0.0646 0.023* -0.0266 -0.0506
(1.333) (1.333) (1.0149) (1.727) (-0.492) (-0.906)
FDI 0.1096*** -0.1165 -0.2261 0.104*** 0.0129 -0.0910
(3.584) (-0.782) (-1.4866) (3.371) (0.106) (-7.280)
Primary 0.0043 -0.0220* -0.0263** 0.0012 0.0320*** 0.0307***
(1.167) (-1.658) (-1.9621) (0.336) (2.692) (2.548)
Infant mort. -0.0084*** -0.0306*** -0.0222*** -0.0122*** 0.0351*** 0.0473***
(-2.594) (-4.044) (-3.0871) (-3.789) (5.214) (7.474)
Aidothers 0.0004 -0.0306** -0.0309** -0.0013 0.0032 0.0046
(0.139) (-2.447) (-2.4249) (-0.493) (0.322) (0.436)
USEgypt 48.5980***  48.6***  
(18.52)  (18.520)  
Frcolo 12.2503*** 12.21***  
(19.905)  (20.058)  
GBcolo 5.4304*** 5.47***  
(10.274)  (9.973)  
Portcolo 5.2538**  5.33**  
(2.384)  (2.426)  
Spacolo -1.4118  -1.31  
(-0.887)  (-0.828)  
Intercept -1.7364** -1.7374**  -0.90** -0.90  **
(-2.967) (-2.967)  (-1.555) (-1.555)  
No. of obs 14,317 654     14,317  654    
Censored 6,068 209  6,068 70  
Rho 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29  
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Appendix 2 (continued)
Others Denmark Denmark-Others Others Finland Finland-Others
GDPcap -0.00089*** -0.00163* -0.0007 -0.0009*** -0.00015 0.00079
(-5.457) (-1.744) (0.781) (-5.754) (-0.167) (0.883)
GDPcap² 6.29E-09 -1.22E-08 -1.8E-08 1.17E-08 -1.41E-07 -1.527E-07
(0.365) (-0.094) (0.141) (0.677) (-1.23) (-1.323)
Pop -0.0064*** 0.0029 0.009 -0.0071*** 0.016* 0.023***
(-3.16) (0.323) (1.000) (-3.511) (1.86) (2.608)
Pop² 4.75E-06** -3.11E-06 -7.86E-06 5.50E-06*** -1.63E-05* -2.18E-05**
(2.319) (-0.342) (0.843) (2.682) (-1.855) (-2.417)
Trade 191.88*** 592.76 400.88 188.82*** 590.88* 402.06
(4.19) (0.93) (0.624) (4.099) (1.642) (1.109)
1<Globfree<4 2.045*** 2.635** 0.5901 2.097*** 1.596 -0.5013
(8.925) (2.428) (0.529) (9.141) (1.393) (-0.424)
4<Globfree<6 0.7365*** 2.4648*** 1.7283* 0.7819*** 1.5012 0.719
(3.535) (2.568) (1.766) (3.751) (1.488) (0.700)
Growth (-1) 0.0159 0.14302** 0.1271* 0.0206 0.0224 0.0018
(1.164) (2.112) (1.838) (1.502) (0.517) (0.00)
FDI 0.10889*** -0.12603 -0.2349 0.10713*** -0.11890 -0.22603
(3.573) (-0.744) (1.364) (3.512) (-0.684) (-1.281)
Primary 0.00322 0.00106 -0.0022 0.00337 -0.00732 -0.01069
(0.868) (0.073) (0.141) (0.907) (-0.488) (-0.700)
Infant mort. -0.01036*** 0.00708 0.0174** -0.00919*** -0.0107 -0.00150
(-3.226) (0.946) (2.429) (-2.855) (-1.407) (-0.200)
Aidothers -0.00095 0.000446 0.0014 -0.00016 -0.01577 -0.01560











Intercept -1.3731** -1.3731** -1.3681** -1.3681**
(-2.354) (-2.354) (-2.334) (-2.334)
No. of obs 14,317 654 14,317 654
Censored 6,068 361 6,068 319
Rho 0.3017 0.3017 0.2958 0.2958
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Appendix 2 continues
Others France France-Others Others Germany Germany-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0010
(-5.215) (-1.037) (0.529) (-5.813) (0.128) (1.761)
GDPcap² -2.44E-09 4.78E-08 5.02E-08 8.58E-09 -3.4E-08 -4.27E-08
(-0.137) (0.814) (0.825) (0.486) (-0.565) (-0.686)
Pop -0.006*** -0.007 -0.002 -0.005** -0.018** -0.013
(-2.789) (-0.889) (-0.200) (-2.471) (-2.12) (-1.480)
Pop² 4.18E-06** 6.12E-06 1.94E-06 3.52E-06* 1.69E-05** 1.34E-05
(2.034) (0.729) (0.224) (1.714) (2.044) (1.575)
Trade 204.8679*** -326.274 -531.14** 208.533*** -620.41* -828.943**
(4.427) (-1.222) (-1.960) (4.538) (-1.884) (-2.494)
1<Globfree<4 2.2137*** -0.3960 -2.6097*** 2.1498*** 0.8428 -1.3070
(9.53) (-0.455) (-2.910) (9.29) (0.981) (-1.473)
4<Globfree<6 1.0021*** -2.1590 *** -3.1612*** 0.8440*** 0.6349 -0.2091
(4.753) (-2.781) (-3.945) (4.014) (0.811) (-0.265)
Growth (-1) 0.0292** -0.0901 * -0.1193 0.0222* 0.0038 -0.0184
(2.105) (-1.707) (-2.186) (1.602) (0.071) (-0.332)
FDI 0.0821*** 0.2650 ** 0.1829 0.0975*** 0.0987 0.0012
(2.643) (2.207) (1.473) (3.165) (0.819) (0.000)
Primary 0.0017 0.0314 *** 0.0297** 0.0017 0.0263** 0.0245**
(0.458) (2.682) (2.496) (0.468) (2.252) (2.069)
Infant mort. -0.0087*** 0.0035 0.0122* -0.0121*** 0.0395*** 0.0516***
(-2.706) (0.489) (1.794) (-3.754) (4.939) (6.844)
Aidothers -0.0009 0.0105 0.0114 -0.0027 0.0261** 0.0288***













No. of obs 14,317 654 14,317 652
Censored 6,068 29 6,068 17
Rho 0.3062 0.3062 0.3003 0.3003
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Appendix 2 continues
Others Ireland Ireland-Others Others Italy Italy-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0022*** -0.0013 -0.0009*** -0.0013** -0.0004
(-5.319) (-2.76) (-1.643) (-5.618) (-2.027) (-0.574)
GDPcap² 4.27E-09 9.26E-08 8.83E-08 3.46E-10 1.86E-07*** 1.85E-07***
(0.248) (0.971) (0.911) (0.02) (2.647) (2.577)
Pop -0.007*** 0.011 0.018* -0.005*** -0.017** -0.012
(-3.315) (1.179) (1.844) (-2.592) (-1.998) (-1.349)
Pop² 5.06E-06** -9.97E-06 -1.50E-05 3.84E-06* 1.35E-05 9.66E-06
(2.471) (-1.056) (-1.556) (1.878) (1.563) (1.086)
Trade 197.77*** -150.60 -348.37 175.32*** 465.27* 289.95
(4.307) (-0.329) (-0.755) (3.779) (1.783) (1.095)
1<Globfree<4 2.0729*** 2.3678** 0.2950 2.1136*** 1.4856 -0.6280
(9.062) (2.136) (0.265) (9.189) (1.598) (-0.656)
4<Globfree<6 0.7958*** 1.6319* 0.8361 0.8236*** 0.9894 0.1657
(3.827) (1.656) (0.831) (3.941) (1.181) (0.200)
Growth (-1) 0.0204 0.0351 0.0147 0.0225* -0.0014 -0.0239
(1.491) (0.517) (0.224) (1.637) (-0.024) (-0.387)
FDI 0.1014*** 0.0368 -0.0647 0.1031*** 0.0004 -0.1026
(3.323) (0.242) (-0.412) (3.371) (0.003) (-0.721)
Primary 0.0021 0.0258* 0.0237* 0.0018 0.0290** 0.0273**
(0.569) (1.772) (1.616) (0.479) (2.227) (2.066)
Infant mort. -0.0093*** -0.0076 0.0017 -0.0110*** 0.0191*** 0.0301***
(-2.882) (-0.941) (0.224) (-3.428) (2.625) (4.367)
Aidothers 0.0004 -0.0324* -0.0328** 0.0003 -0.0229** -0.0232**











Intercept -1.3858** -1.3858** -1.1525** -1.1525**
(-2.375) (-2.375) (-1.981) (-1.981)
No. of  obs 14,317 654 14,317 652
Censored 6,068 395 6,068 102
Rho 0.2966 0.2966 0.2951 0.2951
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Appendix 2 continues
Others Japan Japan-Others Others Netherlands Netherlands-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0009*** -0.0006 0.0003
(-5.697) (-1.057) (0.700) (-5.582) (-1.18) (0.510)
GDPcap² 9.81E-09 -1.67E-08 -2.65E-08 6.16E-09 2.74E-08 2.124E-08
(0.555) (-0.291) (-0.447) (0.348) (0.466) (0.346)
Pop -0.006*** -0.005 0.001 -0.006*** -0.003 0.003
(-2.976) (-0.626) (0.100) (-2.924) (-0.381) (0.316)
Pop² 4.68E-06** 8.15E-07 -3.86E-06 4.41E-06** 1.49E-06 -2.92E-06
(2.269) (0.099) (-0.458) (2.143) (0.175) (-0.332)
Trade 182.432*** 318.65** 136.2185 217.70*** -52.28 -269.99*
(3.818) (1.895) (0.781) (4.526) (-0.363) (-1.780)
1<Globfree<4 2.0873*** 2.0419** -0.0453 2.1399*** 1.1274 -1.0124
(8.956) (2.414) (-0.000) (9.248) (1.272) (-1.109)
4<Globfree<6 0.8123*** 1.1048 0.2925 0.8167*** 0.8653 0.0486
(3.843) (1.436) (0.374) (3.881) (1.09) (0.000)
Growth (-1) 0.0162 0.0916* 0.0754 0.0241* -0.0132 -0.0373
(1.164) (0.517) (1.378) (1.74) (0.517) (-0.678)
FDI 0.0820*** 0.3589*** 0.2769** 0.1121*** -0.1777 -0.2897**
(2.635) (3.02) (2.254) (3.652) (-1.239) (-1.977)
Primary 0.0019 0.0216* 0.0197* 0.0029 0.0051 0.0022
(0.517) (1.854) (1.661) (0.786) (0.434) (0.173)
Infant mort. -0.0088*** -0.0123* -0.0035 -0.0097*** 0.0024 0.0122**
(-2.738) (-1.85) (-0.566) (-3.003) (0.367) (1.949)
Aidothers -0.0018 0.0109 0.0128 -0.0018 0.0160* 0.0178*











Intercept -1.1362** -1.1362** -1.4249** -1.4249**
(-1.942) (-1.942) (-2.435) (-2.435)
No. of obs 14,317 654 14,317 654
Censored 6,068 19 6,068 61
Rho 0.3089 0.3089 0.2969 0.296935
Appendix 2 continues
Others New Zealand NZ-Others Others Norway Norway-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0019** -0.0010 -0.0009*** -0.0017** -0.0008
(-5.42) (-2.411) (-1.265) (-5.437) (-1.914) (-0.90)
GDPcap² 6.07E-09 7.21E-08 6.60E-08 7.02E-09 -1.00E-08 -1.702E-08
(0.352) (0.84) (0.755) (0.407) (-0.085) (-0.14)
Pop -0.007*** 0.027*** 0.035*** -0.007*** 0.008 0.014*
(-3.64) (2.935) (3.643) (-3.387) (0.873) (1.62)
Pop² 5.88E-06*** -3.01E-05*** -3.6E-05*** 5.09E-06** -6.08E-06 -1.12E-05
(2.873) (-3.159) (-3.695) (2.48) (-0.685) (1.23)
Trade 154.52*** 842.08*** 687.56*** 230.72*** -140.35 -371.07
(3.296) (3.636) (2.910) (4.724) (-0.53) (-1.38)
1<Globfree<4 2.0361*** 4.1270*** 2.0909* 2.0868*** 2.1813** 0.0945
(8.924) (3.25) (1.625) (9.092) (2.083) (0.10)
4<Globfree<6 0.8313*** 1.3700 0.5387 0.8233*** 0.9212 0.0980
(4.017) (1.115) (0.436) (3.948) (0.983) (0.10)
Growth (-1) 0.0178 0.0943 0.0765 0.0170 0.1077* 0.0906
(1.307) (1.261) (1.005) (1.243) (0.517) (1.37)
FDI 0.0890*** 0.2845** 0.1954 0.1069*** -0.1294 -0.2363
(2.907) (2.001) (1.345) (3.507) (-0.75) (-1.35)
Primary 0.0030 0.0080 0.0049 0.0025 0.0137 0.0112
(0.824) (0.483) (0.300) (0.669) (0.969) (0.78)
Infant mort. -0.0077** -0.0444*** -0.0367*** -0.0096*** -0.0047 0.0049
(-2.409) (-4.484) (-3.780) (-3.004) (-0.609) (0.67)
Aidothers -0.0014 0.0073 0.0087 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0016











Intercept -1.4396** -1.4396** -1.3622** -1.3622**
(-2.464) (-2.464) (-2.332) (-2.332)
No. of obs 14,317 652 14,317 654
Censored 6,068 452 6,068 343
Rho 0.2958 0.295 0.2971 0.2971
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Appendix 2 continues
Others Sweden Sweden-Others Others Switzerland Switzerland-Others
GDPcap -0.0009*** -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0009 *** -0.0012** -0.0003
(-5.55) (-1.486) (-0.374) (-5.566) (-1.919) (-0.490)
GDPcap² 7.69E-09 -9.00E-09 -1.67E-08 9.24E-09 8.32E-09 -9.2E-10
(0.447) (-0.087) (-0.458) (0.532) (0.114) (-0.000)
Pop -0.006*** 0.009 0.015* -0.007*** 0.010 0.016*
(-3.156) (0.96) (1.612) (-3.301) (1.093) (1.800)
Pop² 4.67E-06** -6.54E-06 -1.12E-05 5.21E-06*** -1.11E-05 -1.63E-05*
(2.285) (-0.712) (-1.192) (2.54) (-1.281) (-1.833)
Trade 200.08*** -458.45 -658.54 189.49*** 167.10 -22.39
(4.36) (-0.922) (-1.319) (4.129) (0.39) (-0.000)
1<Globfree<4 2.1823*** -0.5208 -2.7031** 2.2555*** -0.7252 -2.9807***
(9.527) (-0.495) (-2.022) (9.76) (-0.804) (-3.214)
4<Globfree<6 0.8317*** 0.2406 -0.5911 0.9157*** -0.5132 -1.4289*
(3.996) (0.257) (-0.616) (4.358) (-0.642) (-1.738)
Growth (-1) 0.0193 0.0582 0.0389 0.0211 0.0291 0.00801**
(1.404) (0.517) (0.616) (1.526) (0.517) (0.141)
FDI 0.1048*** -0.0143 -0.1191 0.1129*** -0.2513 -0.3642**
(3.432) (-0.095) (-0.775) (3.697) (-1.488) (-2.121)
Primary 0.0015 0.0367*** 0.0351** 0.00358 -0.00614 -0.0097
(0.416) (2.531) (2.400) (0.962) (-0.496) (-0.775)
Infant mort. -0.0092*** -0.0160** -0.0068 -0.008761*** -0.0213*** -0.0125
(-2.867) (-2.043) (-0.906) (-2.73) (-3.089) (-1.929)
Aidothers -0.0024 0.0265** 0.0289** -0.0002 -0.0125 -0.0123











Intercept -1.3391** -1.3391 ** -1.5374 *** -1.5374***
(-2.301) (-2.301) (-2.634) (-2.634)
No. of obs 14,317 654 14,317 654
Censored 6,068 382 6,068 176
Rho 0.3030 0.3030 0.2968 0.2968
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Appendix 2 continues
Others UK UK-Others Others USA USA-Others
GDPcap -0.0010*** 0.0006 0.0017*** -0.0010*** 0.0018*** 0.0029***
(-6.349) (1.1) (2.888) (-6.447) (2.592) (4.015)
GDPcap² 1.79E-08 -9.89E-08* -1.17E-07* 3.01E-08* -4.3E-07*** -4.6E-07***
(-1.019) (-1.648) (-1.879) (1.772 (-5.039) (-5.306)
Pop -0.005** -0.010 -0.005 -0.003 -0.047*** -0.044***
(-2.495) (-1.125) (-0.548) (-1.359) (-5.479) (-5.030)
Pop² 3.50E-06** 1.08E-05 7.30E-06 1.55E-06 3.98E-05*** 3.82E-05***
(-1.708) (1.243) (0.819) (0.767) (4.496) (4.217)
Trade 211.327*** -722.72** -934.047*** 206.826*** -363.995 -570.821**
(-4.61) (-1.99) (-2.551) (4.523) (-1.471) (-2.269)
1<Globfree<4 2.1193*** 2.0366** -0.0827 1.6507*** 7.8989*** 6.2482***
(-9.174) (2.346) (-0.100) (7.253) (9.284) (7.127)
4<Globfree<6 0.8846*** 0.4491 -0.4355 0.6801*** 2.7010*** 2.0210**
(4.218) (0.567) (-0.529) (3.29) (3.439) (2.498)
Growth (-1) 0.0146 0.1291** 0.1145** 0.0385*** -0.2601*** -0.2985***
(1.054) (2.441) (2.095) (2.814) (-4.928) (-5.476)
FDI 0.0945*** 0.2224* 0.1279 0.1169*** -0.2844** -0.4013***
(3.062) (1.841) (1.025) (3.864) (-2.366) (-3.237)
Primary 0.0036 0.0018 -0.0018 0.0029 -0.0064 -0.0092
(0.959) (0.151) (-0.141) (0.776) (-0.511) (-0.728)
Infant mort. -0.0098*** 0.0021 0.0120** -0.0091*** -0.0202*** -0.0112*
(-3.07) (0.323) (1.918) (-2.866) (-3.059) (-1.794)
Aidothers -0.0042 0.0578*** 0.0619*** -0.0006 0.0432*** 0.0438***











Intercept -1.1873** -1.1873** -1.2283** -1.2283**
(-2.042) (-2.042) (-2.144) (-2.144)
No. of obs 14,317 654 14317 654
Censored 6,068 29 6068 86
Rho 0.2962 0.2962 0.3024 0.3024
Notes to Appendix 2 on overleaf.38
Notes to Appendix 2:
Method of estimation: Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time x donor);
For each regression the ‘Others’ column provides parameter estimates for the group of all donors
except one (whose estimates are provided in the next column) ; the third column test differences of
parameters between the specified donor and other donors. All parameters are estimated together;
Rho = standard deviation of the random-effects/ standard deviation of residual;
t-statistics in brackets;
*** = significant at 1% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
* = significant at 10% level.
All tests for random-effect specification passed at 1% level (not shown)